This article analyses and contextualises a variety of relationships between the cultural industries and cultural policy. A principal aim is to examine policies explicitly formulated as cultural (
policies? How do they relate to other kinds of cultural policy, including those more oriented towards media, communications, arts and heritage? In the first section, we analyse the main contexts of the development of these policies, as does Nicholas Garnham in a fuller and somewhat different way in his piece for this issue. Two other contributions focus on more recent development and implementation of such policies outside the geographical contexts where they first came into being. Justin O'Connor looks at attempts to apply a type of urban cultural-industries policy developed in Western Europe in contemporary Russia. Lily Kong looks at the potential limits of cultural-industries policy as directed towards the Hong Kong film industry.
However, we also need to consider a variety of other ways in which cultural industries and cultural markets are affected by cultural policy, other than by government action that formally declares itself to be cultural-industries or creative-industries policy -and a second main aim of this special issue is to answer that need. David Hesmondhalgh looks at British media and cultural policies in the United Kingdom under the Labour government (1997 onwards) : at how Labour policies both responded to the rise of the cultural industries and, in successive waves of neo-liberal marketisation, unleashed new forces in the media sector. Andy C. Pratt analyses how cultural industries policy fits into systems of cultural governance in general, and argues that policy needs to shape the markets for cultural goods as a whole, moving beyond longstanding assumptions in cultural policy. There is also a strong emphasis in this issue on the need to consider the organisational practices and working conditions of cultural workers, as a way of understanding how public policy in general affects cultural industries (Susan Christopherson and Danielle van Jaarsveld) and where cultural industries policy itself might sometimes misunderstand the nature of creative work (Lily Kong).
This introduction is in three parts. The first section asks how the cultural industries became such an important idea in cultural policy, after those industries had been largely invisible in traditional (arts-and heritage-based) policy for many decades. What changed (and what stayed the same)? What drove the major changes? In the second section, we look at a number of problems and conceptual tensions arising from the new importance of the cultural industries in contemporary public policy, including problems concerning definition and scope, and the accurate mapping of the sector, but also tensions surrounding the insertion of commercial and industrial culture into cultural policy regimes characterised by legacies of romanticism and idealism. We also examine the troubled division of labour in this area of academic analysis. In the final section, we conclude by summarising some of the main challenges facing cultural policy and cultural policy studies with regard to the cultural industries.
What Changed?
In accounting for the recent importance of the cultural industries in contemporary cultural policy, we need to begin from the long-term historical perspective. The commercialisation of cultural production began in the nineteenth century in those societies that made the transition from feudalism to capitalism. This commercialisation intensified in advanced industrial societies from the early twentieth century onwards (Bourdieu (1996) and Williams (1981) trace aspects of this history). The rise of the cultural industries was very much bound up with the rise of "mass culture" -a phenomenon that troubled so many twentieth-century intellectuals. Reacting against what they saw as the misleadingly democratic connotations of the term "mass culture", Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer (1979[1947] ) developed the idea of the "culture industry" as part of their critique of the false legacies of the Enlightenment. The term was intended to draw critical attention to the commodification of art.
Related modernist fears of the industrialisation and debasement of art and culture fed cultural policy making in complex ways. In Western European cultural policy, they led in the directions of democratisation, inclusion and greater access in the form of projects intended to make art available to the "the people" (see McGuigan 2004, pp. 38-39) , but also towards exclusivity in the form of subsidy for the producers of certain forms of high culture, rather than those associated with working-class and ethnic minority groups. However, if the rise of the cultural industries, and the responses of intellectuals to their expansion, helped to shape cultural policy, it did so as a ghostly absent presence. The cultural industries were the "other" against which cultural policy reacted, in the shape of arts subsidies, but also in the formation of public service broadcasting in some countries.
In the second half of the twentieth century, the growth of the cultural industries accelerated. A number of factors were involved: rising prosperity in the global North, increasing leisure time, rising levels of literacy, links between the new medium of television and new discourses of consumerism, the increasing importance of "cultural hardware" (i.e., hi-fi and television sets, and later video recorders and personal computers) for the consumer goods industry and so on (see Hesmondhalgh (2002) for an account). By the early 1980s, it was becoming increasingly difficult for cultural policy-makers to ignore the growing cultural industries. The first major attempt to address the rise of the cultural industries in policy circles took place at the international level, driven by UNESCO concerns about the unequal cultural resources of North and South. The UNESCO work recognised an economic dimension to culture and its impact on development, and began to analyse its industrial characteristics. Some of this work provided a basic definition and framework (Girard 1982) surprisingly not taken up by national policy.
At roughly the same time, the cultural industries began to emerge as an issue in local policy making. The cultural policies of the Greater London Council (e.g., GLC 1985) are often cited as a seminal moment. (Nicholas Garnham, a major player in this development in his role as a consultant at the GLC in the early 1980s, analyses this moment of cultural industries policy in his article in this special issue). However, the GLC was disbanded by the British Conservative government in 1986, and so these cultural industries policies were never really implemented (Bianchini 1987) . More influential in the longer term were Sheffield's cultural industries policies, which helped to spread the notion of local cultural industries policies, in particular the notion of "the cultural quarter" (see Frith 1993 ). Sheffield's policy was part of the work of the Department of Employment and Economic Development (DEED): an economic policy institution set on addressing the de-industrialisation of that city. DEED's palliative programmes to move people off unemployment benefit and promote economic recovery found a place for cultural projects. These were not specifically cultural industries policies -they were part of a local economic strategy. This was unusual at the time, but it was a model that was to become increasingly popular. By the early 1990s, a classic collection edited by Bianchini and Parkinson (1993) was able to provide case studies of a number of ways in which cultural policy in Western Europe, sometimes centred on museums and other building projects, but sometimes around cultural industries-related initiatives, was linked to urban regeneration.
During this period, the cultural industries were beginning to make an impact on national policy making. The French Ministry of Culture under the Socialists (1981 to 1986, DAVID HESMONDHALGH AND ANDY C. PRATT 1988 to 1993) devoted special attention to cultural industries, especially film and cinema. However, this can be seen as an extension of concerns about high culture and national identity from the traditional "arts" sector into the high-art end of the cultural industries. Much more influential was the idea that the cultural industries -increasingly renamed the "creative industries" for reasons we shall examine in due course -could be an important way of reinvigorating post-industrial national economies. The Australian Labor Government of Paul Keating was innovative in this respect (Stevenson 2000) , and creative industries policies have been taken up in a number of other countries including Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom (see Volkerling 2001) .
Why the shift to the term "creative industries" from "cultural industries"? Andy Pratt suggests in his article in this special issue that one factor was the desire of the politically centrist Labour government in the United Kingdom to distance themselves from the activities of left-wing metropolitan councils such as the GLC and Sheffield in the 1980s. While some commentators have hailed creative industries policy as a genuine and promising attempt to marry access and excellence (see, e.g., Hughson & Inglis 2001) , others have been more sceptical. Nicholas Garnham argues that the term "creative industries" was adopted primarily in order to promote the development of industries based on the exploitation of intellectual property, and traces the genealogy of such thinking in a number of strands of analysis. For some, "creative industries" has acted as an ineffectual umbrella term for separate film and television policy, as well as a number of other economically vibrant "cultural" activities. However, as already indicated, the United Kingdom has not been alone in its exploration of the cultural and creative industries.
1 In many respects Canada, Australia and New
Zealand have developed more coherent approaches based not only on a recognition of the economic value of the cultural industries, but also of the importance of the construction and defence of a national culture. These approaches, at their best, respect aboriginal rights, high culture and, to a lesser extent, "new cultural forms". Moreover, they seek to address the challenges of "Americanisation" via the market and create a space for local cultural production and consumption. While the cultural and creative industries have achieved much recognition in policy circles, it nevertheless could be argued that very little actual policy has been developed even at the local level. The main exception has been the notion of the "creative cluster" (DTI 2001; Pratt 2004) . By the mid-1990s, the concept of "creativity", for many years critiqued by the radical left for its romantic, individualist heritage, was making a serious comeback in cultural policy. The concept of the "creative city" grew out of "cultural quarter" policies, fusing it with tourism, "flagship projects" such as festivals and a more general concern with city planning in the name of "quality of life" (Landry & Bianchini 1995; Landry 2000) . In some cases, an almost missionary zeal seems to have attached itself to these strategies for the remaking of cities in the name of culture and creativity.
The idea of the "cultural quarter" has remained popular into the 2000s (see Bell & Jayne 2004) and helped produce the offshoot concept of "the cultural cluster" from the 1990s onwards. In analysing this new phase in the use of culture and arts as regeneration strategies, Hans Mommaas (2004) has usefully distinguished between a number of discourses that have tended to be merged together in policy discussions of the benefits of creative clusters and that are in danger of undermining and contradicting each other. Summarising somewhat brutally, they include place-marketing, stimulating a more entrepreneurial approach to the arts and culture, encouraging innovation and creativity, finding a new use for old buildings and derelict sites, and stimulating cultural diversity and democracy. Mommaas notes that while some clustering strategies are limited to artistic-cultural activities, most of them incorporate many other leisure and entertainment elements -bars, health and fitness complexes and the like. And drawing, like other commentators, on the work of Sharon Zukin (e.g., 1991) , he asks whether such strategies represent a genuine cultural advancement, or another "functionalisation" of culture; or even a new mixture of the two.
It is important to realise that the idea that cultural or creative industries might be regenerative was the result of changes in the cultural-industries landscape that were themselves in part the product of cultural policy shifts -when cultural policy is understood in the wider sense, to include media and communications. A number of rationales that sustained a previous era of policy in the communications and media sectors came under increasing challenge in the 1970s and 1980s, including the idea that state-owned monopolies in telecommunications were justified by the need to provide a national utility or common carrier, and the idea that broadcasting was a scarce, national resource, because of limited broadcast radio-magnetic spectrum space.
The successful challenge to these rationales on the part of corporate lobbyists, procompetition academics and "liberalising" policy-makers unleashed a series of waves of marketisation on the media and communications sectors. This began in the United States in the early 1980s, spread to other advanced industrial states from the late 1980s onwards, hit a series of nations emerging from authoritarian rule in the early 1990s, and spread across much of the world since then (Hesmondhalgh 2002) . It has also been taken up in international bodies such as the European Union and the World Trade Organisation, though such marketisation has not gone uncontested. These changes have fuelled the growth of the cultural industries and have added legitimacy to the idea that national and local economies can be regenerated through the cultural industries.
A great attraction of cultural industries policy, at the urban, regional and national levels, for many politicians and advisors, was that cultural policy, previously on the margins in many areas of government, could be seen to be economically relevant in an era when policy was judged primarily in terms of its fiscal rewards (see Hesmondhalgh's article in this special issue on the British Labour government's cultural policy). The popularity of such policies was underpinned by an increasing acceptance amongst both neo-liberal conservatives and the postmodernist left that the commodification of culture was not something that could any longer be "resisted" through arts subsidies and other traditional forms of cultural policy. Moreover, creative industries policy could be portrayed as democratising and antielitist, as opposed to the supposed elitism of arts policy aimed at subsidising cultural production that could not meet its costs through the market. In fact, as Nicholas Garnham argues in this issue, creative industries policy continues to run up against problems of the assessment of merit in relation to cultural products, but masks them under the avowed aim of combining excellence and access. Yet the story should be clear: the 1990s and early 2000s have seen a boom time in cultural policy under the sign of the cultural and creative industries as a result of industrial and cultural changes that have themselves been influenced by broader "cultural" policy decisions.
Problems and Tensions
In spite of the boom in cultural industries policy, a number of problems and tensions surround the role of the cultural industries -as a concept and as a real presence in the cultural landscape -in cultural policy making and academic cultural policy studies. These include definitional, statistical and conceptual problems (and of course these are often intertwined).
Issues of definition and scope are thorny ones indeed in this contested area. Some have argued, on the basis of the flexibility of the term "culture", that it is useless to talk of the cultural industries at all. Others have implied it by arguing that all industries are cultural industries because all industries are involved in the production of goods and services that become part of the web of meanings and symbols we know as culture. This is to stretch the concept beyond breaking point. A more sensible option is to recognise that the main interest in such industries is the symbolic, aesthetic and, for want of a better term, artistic nature of their output because these outputs can potentially have such a strong influence on the very way we understand society -including, of course, cultural production itself.
The most likely way to produce a coherent definition of the cultural industries is to see the boundaries between such symbolic, cultural production and other "non-cultural" kinds of production as porous, provisional and relative, and to think about these boundaries in terms of the relationship between the utilitarian functions and non-utilitarian (artistic/ aesthetic/entertainment) functions of symbolic goods (see Hirsch 1972; Hesmondhalgh 2002, pp. 11-12; Power & Scott 2004, p. 4) . While many -perhaps even all -industries produce objects and services where both utilitarian and non-utilitarian elements are present (whether cars, furniture or washing machines), when it comes to books, television programmes, plays and fine art prints, the non-utilitarian elements clearly outweigh other dimensions. In practice, however, governments have delimited the terrain of the cultural and creative industries in a number of ways according to their purposes, often taking an extremely inclusive approach to argue that the sector is perhaps more economically significant than it really is. This, however, only covers one aspect of the definitional problem. Traditionally, protagonists have debated the "breadth" of the cultural industries -for example, whether to include "low art" forms, heritage, tourism (cultural and mass), and sport. By contrast, Andy Pratt argues in his article for this special issue that questions of "depth" have been relatively neglected in discussions of definitions of the cultural industries (see also Pratt 2001) . Adequate definitions need to explore the whole circuit or cycle of production necessary to produce cultural products. This is closer to the logics deployed in the case of most manufactured goods where car body panels, windows and engine making are, for example, included in definitions of "car-making". In the case of music, one would want to include not only musicians, but also their training, management and promotion as well as the facilities and skilled personnel associated with rehearsal and performance spaces, recording facilities, compact disc pressing plants, inlay printing, and distribution and retail. Critics question whether these activities are really the cultural industries; the answer is surely that the performances could not happen without them. Without these vast surrounding structures, the singer may as well be performing in the shower.
These definitional problems have helped to create a situation whereby, in statistical terms, the cultural industries are under-reported. The relative novelty of the cultural industries as a matter of serious policy concern (at least under that name rather than as a set of individual industries) means that the lag between, on the one hand, the creation of definitions and new census categories and, on the other hand, the implementation of actual surveys has left a knowledge gap. Second, and perhaps more seriously, the traditional taxonomies of industry used by official censuses were developed to monitor a manufacturing economy and ignore much of what are now regarded as the cultural industries (see Pratt 2001) . While attempts to measure employment and output have led to advances in the understanding (and appreciation of the relative level of ignorance) of the cultural industries, precise definitions of the cultural industries have been less important than their use for other ends. Only latterly have questions been asked of the cultural industries and what their precise qualities and parameters might be. A corollary of this has been debates about the case for or against the use of generic economic policies for the cultural industries as a whole, as opposed to specific industries (see Pratt 2004) .
Beyond these statistical problems, a further set of critical tensions are at work in the relationship between the cultural industries and cultural policy. For all the growth in the cultural industries, cultural policies concerned with them are still affected by longstanding assumptions prevalent within traditional cultural policy. One can point to a number of core ideas that underpin the majority of cultural policies:
• the romantic notion of the isolated artist-genius who works for the love of art, typically suffering poverty in a garret room;
• culture is a pure public good, one that should be equally available to all;
• the true value of art is transcendent and can be determined by experts, commonly accompanied by the idea that the monetary value of art is false and the "market" cannot decide; and
• the idealist-humanist notion that culture is "good for the soul", and that exposure to "culture" has a "civilising effect".
The emphasis placed on these notions, and how explicit they are, varies, but they are remarkably resilient in cultural policy making and debate. The cultural industries do not fit easily into cultural policies operating under these assumptions. In the majority of cases of national cultural policy making, cultural industries are sidelined. However, there is a contradiction here: while the cultural industries are sidelined in some policies, this marginalisation often derives paradoxically from an assessment of their important economic role and their power to dominate non-market forms of culture. To reiterate from earlier in this article, we could view the cultural industries as culture's "other" -at least as culture is interpreted in much cultural policy. It is not surprising to find when the cultural industries are placed alongside an idealised culture, they tend to ignite debates about culture versus economy, art versus commerce, and high versus low culture.
Another problem or tension in cultural industries policy relates to the intertwined story that we told above of the development of the cultural industries as big business and the development of local and national cultural industries policy. The cultural industries are marked by the co-existence of large multinational corporations and many small and medium-sized companies (Hesmondhalgh 2002) . The large corporations tend to base their operations in major financial and cultural hubs. Much local cultural policy is built around smaller companies. While large and small companies interact (the large companies often serve as financiers, distributors and marketers as well as producers, and they have increasingly come to use smaller companies as a form of cheap research and development), the "independent" sector is high-risk and unstable -not the ideal conditions for creating regeneration, as a number of studies have shown (Gilmore 2004) .
Tensions between artistic and commercial goals in cultural policy are perhaps particularly significant at the international level. The creative industries policies of various countries mentioned above -Canada, Australia and New Zealand -place considerable emphasis on exports, as well as on a certain amount of cultural protectionism. Here the most significant tension exists with respect to (economic) free trade policies. The dilemma is that if the cultural industries are characterised as economic then they are subject to World Trade Organisation regulations -thus the development of the uneasy notion of the "cultural exception" (the idea, mainly supported by the French government in GATT negotiations, that cultural trade should be exempted from free trade provisions). This is a complex area we cannot address fully here, but it strongly suggests that one should not look at cultural industries policy only at the national level; also that the "first mover advantage" of the United States in (market) cultural production leaves little space for other countries, in most cases, to be more than local niche providers.
Many of the above problems and tensions have arguably been exacerbated by a lack of proper analytical attention to the cultural industries and cultural policy in those areas of academia that might have been expected to be interested in the relationships between them. The cultural industries have not traditionally found much of a place in mainstream economics, where they have generally been considered to be of peripheral importance. In a more recent turn, though, some economists and sociologists have come to see the cultural (or creative) industries as either already or potentially central to contemporary economic life. Yet, in many cases, these analyses are based on dubiously broad definitions of culture and problematic readings of the relevant indicators (see Garnham's analysis in this issue of the relationship of thinking about the Information Society, knowledge economies and intellectual property to "creative industries" policy in the United Kingdom and beyond). Software design of many kinds is blurred with recording; new cafes, restaurants and clubs are merged with television businesses. The result has been a tremendous amount of inflated commentary about the significance of the cultural and creative industries that has often fed, and certainly not counteracted, hype and misunderstandings on the part of policy-makers about the regenerative and other possibilities that might arise from policy in the name of the cultural industries.
The cultural industries were an important concept in the area of media and communication studies usually labelled the "political economy of culture" (e.g., Schiller 1989; Garnham 1990; Golding & Murdock 2000; ) . Policy concerns were often central here in this radical, often neo-Marxian field of analysis. However, in the field of cultural studies, which has often been engaged in bitter polemics with political economy and increasingly dominated the study of the media and popular culture in the 1980s and 1990s, neither the cultural industries nor cultural policy were of central concern. The most notable exception was the work of Tony Bennett and other Australian-based writers (Bennett 1992; O'Regan 1992) , but, until recently (Cunningham et al. 2004) , this cultural policy turn in cultural studies paid relatively little attention to the cultural industries as a sector, focusing instead on the subsidised arts such as museums and individual commercial industries such as television. Sometimes, this more recent work has verged on reproducing the inflated language surrounding "creative industries" policy noted above.
One important potential contribution by cultural studies and the sociology of culture to debates about cultural policy in relation to the cultural industries is the recent attention paid in these fields of study to the tensions between citizenship and consumerism (Miller & Yúdice 2002; Stevenson 2003) . This has recently extended into political theory as David Hesmondhalgh shows in his article in this issue, where he explores, among other issues, the blurring of the identities of citizen and consumer in British communication super-regulator Ofcom's notion of the "citizen-consumer".
More generally, cultural studies and the sociology of culture are, at their best, sensitive to the cultural nuances of the varied roles of culture in its many different forms in contemporary societies. They offer a potential to provide critical input into cultural and media policy in a way that is still under-explored. The work of the Manchester Institute of Popular Culture, over many years, has drawn upon social and cultural theory to understand changes in cultural production and consumption in the contemporary city (O'Connor & Wynne 1996) ; and has had significant input into cultural policy making in the North-West of England and elsewhere. In his piece in this issue, Justin O'Connor extends this work by examining problems surrounding the internationalisation of cultural industries cultural policy as developed in Western Europe. O'Connor reports that the very use of the term "cultural industries" provoked strong resistance in St. Petersburg through its perceived undermining of the autonomy of art. This was particularly problematic in a city whose global tourism brand was based on institutions of high culture. The project to develop a cultural industries policy in St. Petersburg was forced to turn to modernisers who questioned the strict opposition of culture and commerce. (O'Connor, it should be added, also analyses economic as well as cultural factors in his case study.)
One important missing dimension in academic work has been an adequate analysis of the organisational forms and working practices associated with the cultural industries. Outside media studies (Hesmondhalgh 2005) and management and organisation studies (Jeffcutt & Pratt 2002) , such an analysis has generally been underdeveloped, but it remains especially so with regard to implications for cultural policy. Lily Kong demonstrates the benefits of such an approach in her article on the Hong Kong film industry in this issue. Kong shows the multiple scales on which social networks and relationships work in the industry, and how risk is offset by relationships of trust that develop across time and space. Furthermore, she brings insight into the difficulty faced by cultural policy by showing how sceptical the cultural workers she interviewed were about the feasibility of really enhancing such relationships through attempts to create "agglomerations" of producers in Hong Kong.
Susan Christopherson and Danielle van Jaarsveld in their article also examine working practices, but in the new media sector. As we have suggested above, some statistical surveys of the size of the cultural industries artificially inflate their figures by including all forms of software production, but Christopherson and van Jaarsveld show some forms of new media work do have important things in common with other cultural industries, in particular the production of commodities, the main value of which lies in their aesthetic qualities, but also the unclear and malleable nature of the skills required, and the project-based nature of the work. Their important comparative study of the United States, Germany and Sweden shows how the development of new cultural industries is hugely influenced by national policy environments. Yet it is not specifically cultural policy that has the main effect: it is the national employment policy environment -the state of industrial relations and norms regarding employer roles. This potentially connects with important calls in recent cultural policy studies for attention to be paid to the international division of cultural labour (Miller & Yúdice 2002) .
Finally, an important issue raised by the articles by O'Connor, Kong, Christopherson and van Jaarsveld is the international dimension of cultural policy with regard to the cultural industries. Although the focus of these articles is primarily Anglo-American and European, we at least have some indication, both within the articles and the texts they discuss, of the range of international policies and practices involving the cultural industries. With the admirable exception of Lily Kong's article, we have still not successfully broken from a broadly Anglo-American discourse on these topics. We hope this challenge will be taken up in the near future in the pages of this journal.
Current Challenges
In this final section we want briefly to point, in lieu of a premature conclusion, to what we see as the main challenges surrounding the cultural industries and cultural policy. Our objective is to be gently provocative rather than exhaustive. We have organised our thoughts around four themes: aesthetics, knowledge, policy implementation and power.
Aesthetics
The question of aesthetics will not go away. As we have suggested above, the tactic of side-stepping aesthetics or only mentioning them sotto voce merely delays rather than resolves the issue. An example of this problem is the recent call in the United Kingdom for a grand debate around Tessa Jowell's (current holder of the post of Minister for Culture) paper Government and the Value of Culture (Jowell 2004 ). Jowell's concern is that with the exploration of the instrumental value of culture (a topic pioneered by her government department), other values have been lost. In her paper, she seeks to find a position from which to promote what she terms "complex culture", which interestingly by way of justification she yokes to a notion of the welfare state.
Taking another tack entirely, we can point to Tony Bennett's (2000) call for "postaesthetic" cultural policy. His position is founded on a notion of cultural democracy he recommends as "aiming for dispersed patterns of support based on an acceptance of a parity of esteem for the aesthetic values and tastes of different groups within culturally diverse societies" (Bennett 2000) . Such contributions suggest the debate about aesthetics is still relevant; the question is how to apply it to the cultural industries. Three lines of response all seem to displace aesthetics from its primary position: a traditional opposition of aesthetics to the market, the reinvention of a new hierarchy and the pluralisation of aesthetics. While it is clearly attractive to take the third route, Bennett's position still leaves open the question of how communities (or practitioners, or creators, or users?) make their judgments, while Jowell's position rests heavily upon her definition of "complex culture".
Knowledge
Academics always make the following point, but we feel that it must be made here again. We simply need to know more about the cultural industries and how they operate, and what people do and think about during the creation and use of their products. As has been indicated above, there is the challenge of quantitative data availability on the most basic issues, let alone the more specialized concerns of policy-makers and academics. While sceptics may reply that the cultural industries in their commercial dimension produce huge amounts of market research and tracking data, the point that concerns us is "fitness for purpose". Such data are functional for market making; but not for an understanding that will provide an evidence base for policy making or intellectual enquiry. Given that a start has been made on quantitative data gathering, we can perhaps stress the need for more qualitative analysis of the cultural industries that captures their organizational and institutional contexts. Moreover, the question of the operationalisation of concepts of culture, raised at the beginning of this piece, remains a fraught one. It would be unrealistic to hope for universal agreement on such an issue. However, we might strive for transparency in definition and usage as a foundation for comparative analysis.
Policy Implementation
It is an easy point to make and a difficult one to resolve, but policy is nothing without implementation (see Barrett & Fudge 1981) . As Pratt points out elsewhere in this issue, the context and the action of policy making and application can add or subtract as much as the ostensible "objectives". Closer attention to and analysis of the processes and institutions of policy making and implementation would be helpful. This links up to the issue often begged by culture. Where does it "sit" within government? Can, and should, it bridge a number of departments? The question of the legitimation of policy is implied in the discussion of aesthetics above. The issue of instrumentalism (McGuigan 2004) needs to be added to this. The tension between instrumentalism and aesthetics is one that would repay significantly more debate.
Power
Clearly, power differentials exist in the field of cultural policy and the cultural industries. Although the issue of power is implied in the points already covered, there is a constant danger it can be passed over, or disguised, under well-meaning idealism. Researchers and policy makers need to keep the question of power at the forefront of their minds when discussing cultural industries policies. The discussion of cultural democracy by UNESCO (WCCD 1996) suggests the importance of issues of power. However, it is the specifics of the interweaving of economic and national power that generally provide an absolute barrier to an idealized "democracy". Nowhere is this more apparent than on the international stage. The first skirmishes of what may well turn out to be a defining battle are undoubtedly taking place over intellectual property rights and their regulation. The debate includes fervent neo-liberals who want complete individual rights, communitarians such as Lessig (2004) who want an expanded public domain for such "rights", and radical libertarians of the left. Whichever side we choose, the consequences are potentially manifold for what we currently understand as the cultural industries, and their future regulation and planning.
NOTE

1.
In addition to the nations mentioned here, we can add an ever-expanding list that includes: Norway, Denmark, the autonomous regions of Spain, South Africa, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and China as recent converts to the cultural industries. Debates are also well advanced in several Latin American countries and some states of the United States.
